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Introduction 
The premise of this paper is that anarchocapitalism, at least in its Rothbardian 
version,1 presupposes the existence of a natural order or law of human affairs. 
In the next sections of this introduction I shall briefly explain the sense in 
which natural law is crucial to an understanding of anarchocapitalism, 
namely as an order of human agents or natural persons. The concept of law as 
an order of persons is analysed in the body of the paper. I start with a discus-
sion of the distinction between orders of natural and orders of artificial per-
sons. Then, I give an admittedly partial analysis of the notion of law as an 
order of persons. The analysis is presented as a formal axiomatic theory. To 
that theory I add the notion of a natural person as well as the postulates that 
we need for a description of natural law as an order of natural persons. In the 
last two sections, I discuss various ways in which the theory of natural law 
can be linked to descriptions of human affairs and contrast the anarchocapi-
talists’ view of the order of the human world with the alternatives that have 
come to dominate political and social thought.  
Anarchocapitalism and natural law 
The radical libertarian theory of anarchocapitalism rests on the concepts of 
natural law and natural rights. It is a reconstruction of economic theory that 
aims to prove the self-sufficiency of an economic order2 of sovereign natural 
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 M.N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and State (Nash Publishing, Los Angeles, 1970); Idem, 
The Ethics of Liberty (Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1982); Idem, For a 
New Liberty (1973 ; Macmillan, New York, revised edition 1978). David Friedman’s The 
Machinery of Freedom (1973, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, revised edition 1989) is an 
attempt to develop an anarchocapitalist theory on the basis of the ‘utilitarian’ analysis 
of current mainstream economic analysis. 
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 In the language of anarchocapitalism, ‘economic’ and ‘political’ primarily identify dif-
ferent methods or ways of doing things. Popular references are Franz Oppenheimer, 
The State (1914) and Frédéric Bastiat, The Law (1848). While economic actions are law-
ful (with respect to natural law), political actions are not because they involve aggres-
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persons and their voluntary associations. It also seeks to demonstrate how 
rights-violating interventions (crimes) disturb and weaken that order, espe-
cially when they have a systematic or institutionalised character.3  
Anarchocapitalists probably are best known for their relentless critique of 
the state, its coercive practices (war-making, taxation, regulation, monopoli-
sation of vital activities) and also of social organisations and institutions that 
have come to rely on subsidies and privileges granted or protected by the 
state or its legal system. However, the purpose of their critique of politics and 
politicised society is not to identify assorted ‘inefficiencies’ and then to pro-
pose reforms that will make the state and its client-organisations more effi-
cient. Rather, they want to reveal, by theoretical argument and historical and 
comparative studies, the wide range of alternative non-coercive, voluntary 
and just ways of doing things that the state has displaced or crowded out. 
Thus, they apply Bastiat’s distinction between ‘what is seen and what is not 
seen’4 to reveal the inevitable state-induced loss of freedom and justice and 
also the spuriousness of claims concerning the ‘overall efficiency’ of political 
ways of doing things.  
The philosophical basis of anarchocapitalism is the conviction that we live 
in a real world where real, fallible human beings think, speak and act, feel, 
enjoy and suffer. The supposition is that the world is constituted by a multi-
tude of separate, diverse, individual—but not isolated—human agents whose 
survival and well-being depend on their ability to produce (find, make, trans-
port) useful things and to get along peacefully with one another. Thus, anar-
chocapitalist analysis always involves lifting the ideological, corporate or so-
cial veils that obfuscate our view of the human world and the individuals who 
live and act in it. However, the analysis does not stop at a mindless empiri-
cism that merely registers the antics and opinions of human beings. It pro-
ceeds to categorise and judge them by the principles of order that it finds 
within the ontological structure of the human world. In short, anarchocapital-
ism, in its Rothbardian form, stands or falls with its supposition that there is a 
natural order—a natural law—of the human world and that each human per-
son has a place in that order that is delimited by his or her natural rights. 
Moreover, in addition to the theoretical importance all anarchocapitalists at-
tribute to the natural law, many of them subscribe to the view that the natural 
law is normatively significant and consequently that it is an order people 
ought to respect. That is why a proper understanding of natural law and natu-
                                                                                                                              
sive coercion, invasion, unilateral takings or other forms of disrespect for the sover-
eignty of other natural persons. 
3
 Hans Hoppe has deepened that theme considerably in his Democracy : The God that 
Failed (Transaction Publishers, 2001) ; also H.-H. Hoppe, ‘The Private Production of 
Security ‘, (Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1999, XIV,1), 27–52 
4
 Frédéric Bastiat, ‘What is Seen and What is Not Seen’ can be found in many collec-
tions, for example in Bastiat, Selected Essays on Political Economy (Van Nostrand, 
Princeton N.J., 1964). 
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ral rights is necessary for a sensible critique of the theoretical and normative 
claims of anarchocapitalism.  
Understanding ‘natural law’: caveat lector! 
‘Natural law’ is a controversial concept. First of all, there is the unfortunate 
habit of using ‘law’ as an all-purpose word for referring indiscriminately to, 
among other things, an imposed rule (‘lex’), a rule validated by immemorial 
custom or practice and not invalidated by reason, a deduction from a descrip-
tion of some ‘ideal society’, an agreement among rational beings (‘ius’), and 
a condition of order.5 As a result, many people fail to distinguish between 
‘law’ in the sense of a rule that ought to be obeyed or followed (as one would 
obey or follow a commander or a teacher) and ‘law’ in the sense of some-
thing that ought to be respected (as one would respect another person or, say, 
a thing of beauty). Understandable misgivings about ‘natural laws’—
assuming these to be rules that we ought to follow because they supposedly 
are ‘given by’ or ‘found in’ nature—are then easily, but without warrant, ex-
tended to the notion of a natural order of things that we ought to respect.  
Part of the controversy surrounding the concept of natural law stems from 
the difficulty many appear to commentators have, to take the word ‘natural’ 
seriously. Indeed, natural law theory often is derided for being ‘metaphysical’ 
or even wedded to a particular theology. However, the fact that some theories 
of natural law are metaphysical or theological does not mean that natural law 
is something metaphysical or theological. A theory of mice and men can be 
metaphysical but the metaphysics is in the theory, not in the mice and not in 
the men. Natural law theories are, but natural law is not, a product of the hu-
man mind, although human minds are essential elements of the natural law. 
While natural law theorists may learn from their predecessors, their object of 
study is the natural law, not ‘the literature’. 
The purpose of this paper is to give an analysis and explication of the no-
tion of a natural order of human affairs, which is logically independent of any 
metaphysical or theological system. It is true that, for example, Christianity 
and liberalism in the classical tradition call for respect for the natural law of 
the human world.6 Rothbardian anarchocapitalism also insists on respect for 
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 See F.van Dun, ‘The Lawful and the Legal’ (Journal des economistes et des études 
humaines VI, 4, 1996, 555 – 579). 
6
 See F.van Dun, “Natural Law, Liberalism, and Christianity“ (Journal of Libertarian 
Sudies, 2001, XV,3),  1-37. In fact, most popular moral theories recognise that people 
ought to respect the natural order of the human world as it is known by common sense 
and experience, even if their conceptions of it vary enormously in scientific sophistica-
tion or analytical precision. Most of them simply assume that one has to be moral and 
make the best of things within the order of the world as it is. Notable exceptions can be 
found in Western academic moral theories which in many cases are based on the 
gnostic notion that historical experience and received wisdom merely reflect the al-
leged ‘false consciousness’ of historical man. Consequently, only ‘enlightened reason’ 
can grasp the (as far as history is concerned, utopian) condition of ‘true humanity’ and 
deduce the ‘rights of man’ from it as well as specify the code of conduct most likely to 
achieve it. Unfortunately, with their references to the ‘true nature of man’, a lot of those 
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the natural order of human affairs. It has no sympathy for any sort of ‘revolt 
against nature’.7 However, it does not follow that the concept of natural law 
as an order of human affairs in any way depends on the reasons that Chris-
tians, classical liberals, or libertarians adduce for respecting the natural or-
der.8 Indeed, the object of our respect or disrespect must exist independently 
of the answer to the question whether and why we should respect it or not. 
There is no difficulty here if we have in mind the natural order of human af-
fairs, which we should be able to describe regardless of our normative atti-
tude towards it.  
Obviously, that dissociation of the descriptive and the normative aspects is 
impossible if we focus on the conception of natural law as a system of rules, 
commands or practical inferences. Moreover, that conception tends to ob-
scure the difference between ‘natural laws’ that merely are guideposts to a 
good and virtuous life and those that allow one person to enforce his claims 
on others. Then the significance of natural law becomes ambiguous: either all 
natural laws are mere moral admonitions or all of them are legally enforce-
able requirements. That ambiguity has plagued the interpretation of natural 
law theories ever since Thomas Aquinas identified natural law and reason.9  
                                                                                                                              
theories (for example those of Mably, Morelly and some ‘utopian socialists’) used to 
masquerade as natural law theories. Although those exercises in rationalist construc-
tivism were incompatible with the classical-medieval tradition of natural law theory, 
which took the real man to be the historical man, many critics assumed that their criti-
cism of the utopian schemes brought down the classical-medieval tradition as well. 
7
 M.N. Rothbard, Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature, and Other Essays (Libertar-
ian Review Press, Washington, D.C., 1974) 
8
 The natural law theory of the Christian medieval theologians obviously referred to the 
world as God’s creation and to the biblical covenants to derive the conclusion that 
people had to respect the natural order. Rothbard (Ethics of Liberty, op.cit.) assumed 
that Thomistic thinking on the lex naturalis was a sufficient basis for his radical liber-
tarianism. Others, among them H.-H. Hoppe and this writer, have found the ground for 
the obligation to respect the natural order of persons in the practical presuppositions 
of ‘argumentation’ or ‘dialogue’. See N. Stephan Kinsella, ‘New Rationalist Directions in 
Libertarian Rights Theory’ (Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1996, XII,2), 313-326. 
9
 Summa Theologica, IaIIae, question 91, art.2 (concl). Also John Locke, Second Trea-
tise of Civil Government, Chapter II, par. 6. For a modern interpretation of the view that 
natural law is ‘practical reason’, see J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1980). I am not saying that the ambiguity vitiates the Thomis-
tic theory, only that its typical medieval complexity apparently lies beyond the grasp of 
many modern interpreters and commentators for whom ‘law’ invariably connotes ‘en-
forcement by public (political) authorities’. Hence the common complaint that the 
agenda of natural law theory is to legislate morality. However, Thomas clearly distin-
guished between mere sins (that merit disapproval and repentance) and injustices (that 
merit ‘action in justice’ and redress). He also distinguished between vices of the sort 
no virtuous man would engage in and vices that threaten the existence of ‘society’ (not 
this or that particular society but ‘human society’ as a general form of conviviality or 
symbiosis): murder, arson, theft, fraud, robbery, assault and other crimes against per-
sons and property. (Summa Theologica, IaIIae, question 96, art.2 (concl). Only with re-
spect to injustice and especially crime can the coercive power of ‘human law’ inter-
vene. In short, while all virtues are necessarily lawful (sanctioned by the rational 
appreciation of their agreement with divine providence), and all vices are consequently 
unlawful, only a few vices of a particular sort should be made illegal. ‘Legislating mo-
rality’ was not on Thomas’ agenda.  
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Law as Order 
Natural law and artificial law 
For the natural sciences, law is the order of natural things as seen from the 
perspective of a particular discipline or branch of physics, biology, or chem-
istry. The main pre-occupation of a scientific discipline is to identify stable 
patterns of order and to express them as of laws of nature. Scientists also 
search for the conditions of existence of those patterns to determine where 
they do or might break down.  
In the particular restricted sense in which I shall use the word, law is an or-
der of persons. Sometimes, the word ‘law’ is used specifically to denote a 
respectable order. In that sense, law is an order that we ought to respect. 
However, for our purpose, we need not concern ourselves with the question 
of the respectability of an order. Persons are purposeful rational agents, in 
possession of means of action that embody their active powers and faculties 
and that they can use in the hope of attaining some goal. A person’s rights10 
are his means of action and the actions in which he employs them.11 Again, 
people often reserve the word ‘right’ for the respectable means and actions of 
a person.  
Law is either natural or not. Natural law, in the general sense, is the order 
of natural things. In the relevant restricted sense, ‘natural law’ refers to the 
order of natural persons. Usually, human beings—at least those that have the 
capacity of purposive action—are cited as the paradigmatic natural persons, 
although many people assume that there also are non-human natural purpose-
ful agents. However, those who mention such agents usually assume that they 
are part of the same order as human beings or that they somehow participate 
in the human world. In short, natural law is the order of human world, if it is 
not simply the order of human persons.  
An artificial law is an order of artificial things. Here we shall consider it 
only as an order of artificial persons. Such persons are in some respects 
analogous to a natural person. However, an artificial person, for example a 
citizen, is not a thing of the same sort as a natural person.  
As we shall see in this section, ‘natural law’ and ‘natural persons’ belong to 
an essentially different logical category than ‘artificial law’ and ‘artificial 
persons’. There can be any number of artificial laws but only one natural law. 
How we can determine what natural persons are and can do and what the 
conditions are under which their relations are in order rather than disorder, 
differs fundamentally from how we can determine those matters where artifi-
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 ‘Right’ derives from the Latin verb ‘regere’ (to control physically, to rule, to govern).  
11
 Rights, properly understood, are not the now ubiquitous ‘rights to’, which are merely 
lawful claims. To say that my life or my property is my right is not the same as saying 
that I have a right to life or property. On this distinction, see F.van Dun, “Human Dig-
nity: Reason or Desire?” (Journal of Libertarian Studies, 2001, XV, 4), 1-29. 
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cial persons are concerned. To find out about natural persons, go live among 
them; to find out about citizens, consult a lawyer! Obvious as this may be, 
confusion about the categories of natural and of artificial persons is rife.  
The difference between natural law and artificial law is reflected in two 
types of lawlessness (disorder, confusion, conflict) and their corresponding 
notions of justice. A breakdown of artificial law typically manifests itself 
when people fail to play by its rules. Perhaps they refuse to do so. Perhaps 
the rules are such a mess that it is hardly feasible to follow them even if one 
wants to. Justice, in the setting of an artificial law, is the attempt to ensure 
compliance with its rules, whatever they are. That attempt may cause more 
suffering than the breakdown of artificial law. 
A breakdown of natural law manifests itself when people do not heed the 
real distinctions between one person and another that define the natural law. 
The words, actions or property of one person are ascribed to another and ac-
tion is based on the ascription rather than the reality. One person is blamed 
for, or credited with, what another said or did. The guilty and the innocent, 
the producers and the parasites, the debtors and the creditors, the malefactors 
and the victims—they all get confused with one another. Accordingly, jus-
tice, in the setting of natural law, is the attempt to instil respect for the real 
distinctions among persons.  
A overview of artificial law 
Whereas natural law is an order of persons but is not a person itself, an artifi-
cial law can, but need not be, a person. For example, a game of chess is an 
order of persons (Black, White), but the game itself is not a person. However, 
each one of them is composed of other persons: King, Queen, bishops, 
knights, rooks, and pawns. All of those artificial persons are defined by the 
rules of the game. They are legal persons that derive their legal personality 
from the rules of the game. The rules of chess tell us what those persons are 
and what they can, or cannot, do. The game itself is a legal order, a type of 
law. However, as the example makes clear, not every legal order is an artifi-
cial or a legal person. It is a matter of dispute whether every order of artificial 
persons is a legal order.  
Every social organisation or society is an artificial person, subdivided in 
various positions, roles and functions according to its rules and regulations, 
whether they are written down in a rulebook or not. For example, the State is 
an artificial law, a legal order and an artificial, indeed a legal, person. It has 
its Head of State, government ministers, judges, members of Parliament, 
commissioners, mayors, citizens, registered aliens, etcetera. All of those are 
no more than rule-defined personified positions, roles and functions of, or 
within, the legal order of the state. Again, what they are and can do depends 
on the rules of the game of that state, its ‘positive laws’ or legal rules. An-
other example is a business corporation with its CEO, members of the Board, 
financial manager, research co-ordinator, public relations officer, and so on. 
  7 
A business corporation is an artificial law. It is a legal order as well as a legal 
person according to its own legal rules. However, whether it has legal per-
sonality in a particular state depends on the legal order of that state.  
Obviously, the rules of chess do not tell us anything about what those who 
play chess are or can do. Similarly, the legal rules of a state or a corporation 
do not tell us anything about the persons who occupy positions or perform 
functions or roles in their organisation. It is usually taken for granted that 
those persons are human beings. However, that is by no means a logical ne-
cessity, as Caligula demonstrated when he made his horse a consul of Rome12 
and as modern states demonstrate when they authorise computers, cameras 
and radar-equipment to act as police. Modern corporations apparently have a 
great interest in getting rid of the human factor by substituting computers and 
robots for their human personnel.  
An artificial law is defined by a logically arbitrary set of divisions and dis-
tinctions among the artificial persons that are its components. Those divisions 
and distinctions do not depend on the physical characteristics of material 
things or on the natural persons that actually play or fill the roles and posi-
tions specified by the rules of the game. Whether in a game of chess a ‘King’ 
has the same powers as a ‘Queen’ or not, depends exclusively on the rules of 
chess. It does not depend on the shape or the material of the pieces, or on 
such conditions as whether individual men or women, teams or computers 
play the game.  
Artificial persons have no physical characteristics. They are not individuals. 
If the rules of the game that define them allow it, they can be differentiated 
and split up into any number of other persons or merged into one person. Not 
having any physical characteristics, they do not exist independently of a set 
of rules. There is no such thing as ‘a citizen’; there are only Dutch citizens 
(defined by the positive laws of the Dutch state), Bulgarian citizens (defined 
by Bulgarian law), and so on. Nor is there such a thing as ‘a King’. It de-
pends on the appropriate rulebook whether a King cannot be captured, can 
trump any other card except an ace, dismiss the government or name his own 
successor. Sometimes, there may be confusion concerning the natural or arti-
ficial status of a person. As a person who makes a study of, say, physics or 
economics, one can be a student independently of any artificial law. How-
ever, at a university, there are numerous rules that define what ‘students’ [of 
that university] are and what they can, or cannot, do. Not all students are 
‘students’—and vice versa.  
The natural law must be defined in terms of natural, real, objective divi-
sions and distinctions. It is an order of natural persons, which must be identi-
fied as they are and for what they are. The physical and other characteristics 
that make something a natural person are all-important. Natural persons are 
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 The story, propagated by the Roman historians Suetonius and Dio Cassius, probably 
is based only on rumours. However, it wonderfully illustrates the point I am trying to 
make.   
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individuals. Splitting a natural person only results in maiming or killing him. 
Merging two natural persons does not result in the appearance of one new 
person. If there are true statements about what natural persons are and can do 
then those truths must be discovered—they do not exist by stipulation. The 
natural law is an objective condition that we can describe as it is. Per se, the 
natural law has no normative meaning, which is not to say that it is norma-
tively insignificant, irrelevant, or unimportant for natural persons. 
Law and obligation 
Philosophically speaking, it is an open question, whether natural persons 
ought to respect the natural law. To answer that question requires serious 
thought. What a natural person can do does not translate into what he may do. 
What such a person ought to do does not translate into what he must do.  
With respect to artificial persons, that question does not even arise. They do 
not exist independently of the rules that specify what they are or what they 
can or cannot do. In chess, neither Black nor White, neither a King nor a 
pawn can cheat. When the question arises whether Black, or the Black King, 
ought to do this or that, then it is not as a question about his obligations under 
the law of chess. It is as a question about the best next move—and the answer 
to that question depends crucially on the goals or utility-functions that the 
rules of the game define for the various pieces. Obviously, people can cheat 
when they play chess, but even as chess-players they occasionally may 
change the predefined utility-functions of the game. That happens when 
granddad plays against his grandson and lets him win, or when a teacher de-
liberately makes a ‘bad move’ to test his pupil’s ability to spot an opportu-
nity. Then they are not engaging in ‘serious play’, but they are not cheating.  
For Black and White, the rules of the game are mere descriptions of what 
they can or cannot do. For chess-players, those rules translate immediately 
into normative formulas. ‘King can’ becomes ‘when moving King, you may’, 
‘knight cannot’ becomes ‘when moving knight, you may not’. Likewise, 
what a citizen of state X can or cannot do translates immediately into what a 
natural person may or may not do as a citizen of that state. Often such a per-
son can stay clear of the law even tough he does not play his role seriously, 
but occasionally a judge or administrator will confront him with a predefined 
utility-function and subject him to sanctions for not being ‘a good citizen’.   
No serious thought is required to answer the question whether a natural per-
son, considered as an actor in an artificial order, ought to respect its rules. It 
is true by definition that chess-players ought to respect the rules of chess. It is 
true by definition that as a citizen of a state one ought to obey its rules.  
However, is it a matter of definition that rulers ought to respect the interna-
tional law? Some people say it is, because, in their opinion, international law 
is a legal order in which rulers act as states, which are artificial persons de-
fined by the rules of international law. Some say that the analogy of the rules 
of chess is even stronger. For them, the rules of international law identify not 
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only the parties (states, the analogues of Black and White) but also the com-
position of the parties (the constitutional order of a state, the analogues of 
Kings, Queens, rooks, and pawns). In their view, international law requires 
that states have, among other things, a Parliament, an independent judiciary, 
and universal suffrage, perhaps even a predefined utility-function, say, a 
commitment to human rights. 
Others say that states exist independently of international law and that 
therefore international law must be derived from the characteristics of states. 
For them, it is an open question whether rulers ought to respect the interna-
tional law. If it is part of the self-definition of a particular state that it owes 
no respect to other states, then obviously the rulers of that state have no legal 
obligation to respect international law. To avoid the conclusion that there is 
no international law, it is often maintained that international law is an anal-
ogy of natural law. The idea is that all states are ‘independent sovereign per-
sons of the same kind’, irrespective of their particular size or political charac-
teristics. Thus, it is claimed that they are analogous to natural persons, who 
are all free persons of the same kind, irrespective of their particular physical, 
intellectual or moral characteristics. Then, on the assumption that natural per-
sons, regardless of their personal opinions, are under an obligation to respect 
natural law, it is argued that, in an analogous way, states are under an objec-
tive obligation to respect international law. Consequently, rulers acting as 
states ought to respect international law, no matter what the legal self-
definition of their states may be. 
 Clearly, however, no amount of information about the rules of an artificial 
order tells us anything about what a natural person as such may or may not 
do. Whether assuming the role of a chess-player, a citizen or an official of 
some state or other is a good move in life; whether it is something that one at 
least has the right to do—these questions make sense only for those who look 
beyond ‘the games people play’ to the people who play them. That is exactly 
what anarchocapitalists intend to do. For that reason, the ruling methodologi-
cal paradigm of positivism is anathema to them. 
Positivism and socialisation 
The central dogma of positivism in fields such as ‘law’ and ‘economics’ is 
that every order is artificial. There are no natural orders, or, if there are, they 
are not suitable objects of scientific investigation. Consequently, persons can 
be admitted as objects of study only if they are disguised as artificial persons. 
In economics, positivism typically involves the personification of ‘theoretical 
constructs’ (for example, utility functions) constrained by the rules of a 
model or a simulation.13 It fits the profile of a technology of want-satisfaction 
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 The analogy with the game of chess is close. After all, Black and White also are per-
sonified utility functions constrained by rules. However, chess players do not assume 
that they are only a few adjustments of the rules away from having a ‘true model’ of 
what happens in a real battle. 
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that characterises modern neo-classical and mainstream economics, but obvi-
ously is useless for the anarchocapitalists’ program of research into the 
conditions of order and disorder of the real human world. 
Legal positivism concentrates on the study of artificial ‘positive’ law while 
ignoring or denying that there is a natural law. Human beings are only acci-
dentally involved in ‘positive law’, namely as occupying one social position 
or another or as performing one function or another. Ideally, they are fully 
socialised. Having internalised the rules that define it, they identify them-
selves completely with their position, role or function. As Rousseau put it, 
they then no longer act according to their own natural particular will. Instead, 
they act according to the society’s general will, which is expressed in its legal 
rules. In short, they act as if they really were citizens. However, if a human 
being is not fully socialised, he or she is a ‘deviant’ and needs to be ‘cor-
rected’ or forced to comply with the general will. At the very least, ‘incen-
tives’ must be administered to enhance compliance with the legal rules.  
Thus, legal positivism has no resources to comprehend relations in which 
people participate regardless of their social position or function in this, that, 
or indeed any legal or social order. It cannot recognise the natural convivial 
order of human affairs, which is the primary object of study for natural law 
theorists. While legal positivism is deficient in that respect, it also is a bearer 
of an ideological program of socialisation (‘socialism’) that seeks to control 
the human factor to immunise particular social orders and their artificial law 
from the incessant corruptive influences of human nature. As such, it is radi-
cally opposed to the endeavours of the natural law theorists, who are intent 
on humanising societies rather than on socialising human beings. Long 
dominant among adherents of the major traditions of Christianity and classi-
cal liberalism, the natural law theorists consistently have urged that societies, 
especially political societies, should respect the natural law no less than indi-
viduals. After all, societies are nothing more than organisations of human en-
deavour, ways in which people do things to one another in the pursuit of 
some alleged common purpose.  
Law as an order of persons and their means of action 
An axiomatic approach to persons and relations 
For the moment, we shall disregard the distinction between natural and artifi-
cial persons. We focus on the general notion of law as an order of persons. 
What follows is an informal presentation of a formal theory of law in that 
sense.14 For the sake of simplicity, we consider only persons and the means 
of action that belong to them. A full analysis should consider also the actions 
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 For a more technical and fuller exposition, see my “The Logic of Law” (in the Sam-
ples section of my Website http://allserv.UGent.be/~frvandun/welcome.html). Some 
paragraphs of this section are taken almost verbatim from that paper. 
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of persons. As we shall see, even our simplified discussion will bring to light 
many patterns of order that are familiar from the philosophical and theoreti-
cal literature on law. 
‘X lawfully belongs to y’ is the basic relation in our conceptualisation of 
law. It is a relation between a means of action (‘x’) and a person (‘y’). As a 
synonym for ‘the means of action that lawfully belong to a person’, we occa-
sionally shall use the term ‘property’. Alternatively, we shall say that if a 
means of action lawfully belongs to a person then that person is responsible 
or answerable for that means.15  
We introduce two axioms that restrict the set of possible interpretations of 
the relation ‘x lawfully belongs to y’ (which we henceforth shall write simply 
as ‘x belongs to y’). 
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The first axiom recognises that it is appropriate to ask, with respect to any 
person, to whom that person belongs. Possible answers to that question are 
that the person belongs to himself and to no other person; that he belongs to 
himself and possibly also to other persons; or that he belongs only to one or 
more other persons. Only the answer ‘he belongs to no person’ is excluded. 
Thus, our axiom stipulates that in law there is no person for whom no one is 
responsible or answerable. It is an implication of the first axiom that every 
person is at the same time a means of action for some person or persons—
himself or one or more others. For example, a corporate person is a means of 
action of its owners; a slave is a means of action of its master, whether the 
slave is considered a person or not.   
The second axiom makes persons the central elements of law. Means of ac-
tion follow the persons to whom they belong. Thus, what lawfully belongs to 
a person comes to belong lawfully to another when the former becomes the 
slave of the latter person (assuming there is such a thing as lawful slavery). 
Obviously, the axioms allow us to define different sorts of persons in terms 
of the relation ‘x belongs to y’. For example, we can define the concepts of a 
real person (as against an imaginary one) and a free person (as against one 
who is not free) as follows: 
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 ‘X belongs to Y’ literally means that Y has an interest vested in X—an investment. In 
Dutch and German translations, it means that X listens to (or obeys) Y. In French, it 
means that X is linked to Y (as part to whole, or as periphery to centre).  
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Obviously, only real persons can be free. An imaginary person, therefore, is 
not free. On the other hand, a real person who is not free must belong to some 
other person(s). Indeed, a real person is not free if and only if he belongs to 
some other persons. 
We also can define the concepts of sovereign, autonomous, and heterono-
mous persons: 
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It follows that free persons are sovereign. Because of Axiom 1, it also fol-
lows that sovereign persons are free. Although the definitions of ‘free person’ 
and ‘sovereign person’ differ, the two concepts are logically equivalent 
within the formal theory of law. Moreover, only real persons can be autono-
mous. Consequently, imaginary persons must be heteronomous. Heterono-
mous persons are not free. 
This is a good place to introduce the distinction between the relations 
among ‘masters’ and ‘serfs’ on the one hand and among ‘rulers’ and ‘sub-
jects’ on the other hand. If S is a heteronomous person who belongs to an-
other person M, then S is a serf of M, his master. However, if S belongs to R, 
who is an autonomous person, then S is a subject of ruler R. Clearly, a master 
need not be a ruler because the concept of a master does not, whereas the 
concept of a ruler does, imply autonomy. Likewise, a subject is not necessar-
ily a serf because an autonomous person can be the subject of a ruler, al-
though he cannot be a serf. If the concept of autonomous subject strikes one 
as odd, one should bear in mind that at least one historically influential the-
ory—Rousseau’s theory of citizenship—was centred on the notion that, in a 
legitimate state, subjects and rulers are the same persons. Rousseau’s ‘citi-
zens’ were said to be free because they lived under a law that they somehow 
had made themselves. They ruled themselves and were their own subjects, 
although no individual in the state was a sovereign person. According to 
Rousseau’s conception of the legitimate state, every citizen should rule him-
self and every other citizen while being under the rule of every citizen.  
From definitions 5 and 6, it immediately follows that sovereign persons are 
autonomous. It does not follow that all autonomous persons are sovereign. 
Thus, while every person is either autonomous or heteronomous, it is not the 
case that only heteronomous persons lack sovereignty. Persons—for exam-
ple, Rousseau’s citizens—may be autonomous yet not sovereign. If that is the 
case for a particular person, we shall say that he is strictly autonomous. 
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Obviously, an autonomous person is either sovereign or strictly autonomous. 
If he is sovereign then he is free and belongs to himself and only to himself. 
However, if he is strictly autonomous then he is not free because he then nec-
essarily belongs to some other person or persons. In that case, the latter must 
in turn belong to him (otherwise he would not be autonomous).  
Our definitions imply that every person either is sovereign or else either 
strictly autonomous or heteronomous. Thus, in law, the class of persons is 
partitioned exhaustively in three mutually exclusive subclasses of sovereign, 
strictly autonomous, and heteronomous persons. About the number of per-
sons (if any) in any of those sets, our formal theory has nothing to say. How-
ever, some general quantitative results can be derived. For example, we know 
that every non-sovereign person belongs to at least one other person. Conse-
quently, strict autonomy and heteronomy appear only in a world with at least 
two persons. Conversely, if there is only one person in the world, then the 
concept of law implies that he must be sovereign. Also, if only one person is 
autonomous then he must be sovereign. Moreover, we can use a process of 
inductive generalisation to arrive at the result that all persons can be heter-
onomous only in a world with an infinite number of persons. In other words, 
only in such an infinite world can there be serfs who are not subjects, or mas-
ters but no rulers. Conversely, in a world with a finite number of persons, at 
least one must be autonomous and all serfs must be subjects of some ruler.  
Autonomous collectives 
A strictly autonomous person always belongs to another strictly autonomous 
person, who in turn belongs to him. Thus, he is always ‘in community’ with 
at least one other strictly autonomous person. Both of them, we shall say, are 
members of the same autonomous collective. Obviously, every strictly 
autonomous person is a member of an autonomous collective. Indeed, while 
there may be any number of autonomous collectives (subject, of course, to 
the condition that such a collective must have at least two members), a 
strictly autonomous person is a member of one and only one autonomous col-
lective. That is so because every member of an autonomous collective be-
longs to every one of its members. Consequently, if a person is a member of 
autonomous collectives C1 and C2, he belongs to every member of both col-
lectives, every member belongs to him, and therefore (by Axiom 2) every 
member of C1 belongs to every member of C2, and vice versa. Then the 
members of C1 and C2 are members of the same autonomous collective, and 
C1 and C2, having the same members, are the same collective.  
By Axiom 2, whatever belongs to a member of an autonomous collective 
belongs to every one of its members. An autonomous collective, therefore, is 
a perfect community, exhibiting a perfect communism of persons and their 
means of action.  
The members of an autonomous collective may be masters and rulers of 
other persons. The latter are the serfs and subjects of each of the members. 
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The members, of course, are rulers and subjects of one another. However, as 
autonomous persons, they cannot be serfs of any master. Nor can they be the 
subjects of any ruler who is not a member.  
Autonomous collectives are well known in the history of the philosophy of 
law and rights. For example, we may represent Hobbes’ natural condition of 
mankind as an autonomous collective. In the natural condition, Hobbes 
wrote, there is no distinction between ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ as every person has 
a right to everything, including ‘one another’s body’. Consequently, there is 
no distinction between justice and injustice.16 His argument was that the 
autonomous collective of the natural condition was an impractical, indeed 
life-threatening state of affairs. For him it was a dictate of reason that men 
should abandon the condition of the autonomous collective and should reor-
ganise in one or more ‘commonwealths’. Each of those would be defined by 
the relationship between a free person (ruler-master) and a multitude of sub-
jects (who are also serfs).  
No less famously, Rousseau’s conception of the State is one of an autono-
mous collective. The social contract requires every human person who be-
comes a party to the contract to give all of his possessions, all of his rights, 
indeed himself, to all the others. In this case, the members of the autonomous 
collective give up the distinctions between ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ and between 
justice and injustice. Unlike Hobbes’ men in the natural condition, however, 
the members of Rousseau’s civil autonomous collective are not supposed to 
act according to their particular ‘natural will’ (their human nature). They are 
supposed to act as ‘citizens’, according to the statutory ‘general will’ of the 
collective itself. We have to suppose that the general will is the same for all 
citizens qua citizens, because by definition a citizen qua citizen is animated 
by nothing else than the statutory purpose of the association. Rousseau’s citi-
zens, therefore, are committed to act according to the legal rules that express 
the determinations of the ‘general will’ in particular circumstances. Rousseau 
set out to prove to his own satisfaction that an autonomous collective could 
be a viable option, at least in theory, if certain conditions were met. The es-
sential condition was that a political genius should succeed in turning natural 
men and women into artificial citizens of the right kind.  
Rousseau and Hobbes, then, agreed on the thesis that natural law — the 
principle of freedom among likes (natural persons of the same kind) — had 
to be replaced by positive legislation. Rousseau, however, thought that it was 
theoretically possible to reproduce the formal characteristics of natural law as 
‘liberty and equality’ for the members of an autonomous collective. That was 
the basis of his claim to have ‘squared the political circle’, that is, to have 
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 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan; Book I, Chapter 13, “Of the Naturall Condition of Man-
kind, as Concerning Their Felicity, and Misery”. Note the contrast with Locke’s ‘state of 
nature’, which is an order of sovereign persons for whom the distinction between jus-
tice and injustice is crucial. We shall examine the formal contrasts between the ‘rights’ 
of strictly autonomous and sovereign persons in the next section. The implications for 
human beings (natural persons) are spelled out thereafter.  
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proven that the state could be legitimate, in accordance with the formal re-
quirements of justice. Formally, his solution requires that we distinguish 
sharply between natural persons and citizens. We have to suppose that for 
every Jean and Jacques, members of the same autonomous collective, there is 
a person that is different from both, a citizen Jean and a citizen Jacques. We 
also have to suppose that the latter ‘civic personae’ are merely numerically 
different manifestations of the same person, the Citizen. We can express 
those suppositions formally as follows: 
 
* For every member of an autonomous collective there is another 
person who is his civic persona. 
* The civic personae of any two members of the same autonomous 
collective are identical. 
 
The relation between a natural person and his legal or civic personality (in 
Rousseau’s theory) should be represented as  
 
* A member of an autonomous collective legally belongs to his own 
civic persona but the latter does not legally belong to him.  
* Whatever belongs to a member of an autonomous collective legally 
belongs to his civic persona. 
 
Thus, the natural persons Jean and Jacques may be members of the same 
autonomous collective (‘the People’), and then they are strictly autonomous 
in their dealings with one another. On the other hand, as natural persons they 
also legally and heteronomously belong to their own civic persona, the Citi-
zen. They are subjects and serfs of the Citizen, who is a sovereign person. 
Hence, the Citizen may use force against them to free them from their own 
human nature and to make them into what they presumably want, and by ac-
cepting the social contract have committed themselves, to be: citizens. That, 
of course, is Rousseau’s ‘paradox of liberty’.17 It is not really a paradox 
within his system: there is no place for free natural men in the state, as they 
would immediately destroy the unity that is the necessary condition of the 
sovereignty (hence the liberty) of the citizen.  
Note that we had to introduce a modal notion of belonging, namely ‘to be-
long legally’, to make sense of the theory. The way in which one natural per-
son belongs to another natural person cannot be the same way in which one 
such person belongs to some artificial persona. Indeed, if A is a natural 
member of an autonomous collective and A belongs to his civic persona c(A) 
in the same way in which he belongs to the other natural members of the col-
                                                 
17
 “In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly in-
cludes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to 
obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means noth-
ing less than that he will be forced to be free….”  J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract 
(Everyman’s Library, E.P. Dutton & Co.; translated by G.D.H. Cole), Book I, chapter 7. 
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lective, then c(A) would be just another member of the collective — a strictly 
autonomous person. Rousseau’s theory of the state then would be simply 
Hobbes’ theory of the natural condition of mankind with an additional num-
ber of ghostly fictions participating in the war of all against all. Hobbes’ the-
ory of the social contract, by the way, also had to introduce a ‘legal’ notion of 
belonging. Politically, in the state, the subjects belong to the ruler. However, 
the latter legally belongs to the citizens, who supposedly have ‘authorised’ 
him to do what he wants. Thus, the Sovereign legally is the ‘actor’ or agent, 
of whose actions the citizens are legally supposed to be the ‘authors’. Conse-
quently, he rules them by their own authority.  
We should also note that Rousseau’s ‘solution’ to the problem of the le-
gitimate state rests crucially on his inversion of the natural order of things. 
While the common aspect-person (the Citizen) is the product of the human 
imagination, the theory elevates him to the status of a sovereign person for 
whom his creators are merely subjects and serfs. It takes ‘L’imagination au 
pouvoir!’ very literally indeed. Rousseau’s theory redefines the perspective 
on order among persons in terms of a ‘legal’ notion of belonging that requires 
a reference to the common aspect-person, the Citizen. That Citizen is the 
civic persona c(P) of every human member of the autonomous collective cre-
ated by the social contract. If it were not for the inversion of the natural order 
of things, the notion of an aspect-person would be unobjectionable. For ex-
ample, assuming that 
 
* Aspect-persons are the serfs of the persons from whom they were 
abstracted, 
 
aspect-persons simply would be heteronomous (artificial or imaginary) per-
sons under the responsibility of their human masters. Then, Jacques’ rights-
as-a-citizen could never supersede his personal rights. Thus, article 2 of the 
Declaration of the rights of Man and Citizen (1789) asserted that the protec-
tion of natural rights is the sole function of political association. In other 
words, the citizen was to be no more than a tool or instrument for safeguard-
ing the natural rights of natural persons, all of which ‘are born and remain 
free and equal in rights’ (article 1 of the Declaration).   
Rights 
In this section, we introduce ‘rights talk’, without adding anything to the 
theoretical apparatus we have used so far. We reduce the notion ‘right to do’ 
fully to the notion of ‘belonging’. First, we define the notion of a right to 
deny a person the use of some means. 
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Note that this definition merely states the truth-conditions of statements of 
the form specified in the definiendum. Thus, to refute the claim that P has 
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right to deny Q the use of X, one may point out that neither X nor Q belongs 
to P or that P is a serf or subject of Q.  
As an immediate consequence, we have the theorem that no person has 
right to deny himself the use of himself. Indeed, according to definition 9, the 
statement that a person has right to deny himself the use of himself is true if 
and only if that person belongs to himself and does not belong to himself—
but that is a contradiction, which cannot be true. Another consequence is that 
a person has right to deny himself the use of any means only if it belongs to 
him. The right to deny the use of a means to a person does not belong to one 
to whom that means does not belong. Making use of definition 9, we now 
define the notion of a right to use some means (or person) without the con-
sent of some person.18 
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Obviously, if a person P has right to the use of some means without the con-
sent of person Q, then Q has no right to deny P the use of it. It also follows 
that all real, and only real, persons have right to the use of themselves with-
out their own consent. An imaginary person does not have that right because 
he does not belong to himself.  
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Not surprisingly, all autonomous, in particular sovereign, persons have the 
absolute right to the use of themselves.  
No person has right to the use of a means that belongs to an independent 
other person (that is, one that does not belong to him) without the consent of 
that person. Because a sovereign person is independent of any other, it also 
follows that no person has the right to the use of a sovereign person’s prop-
erty without his consent.  
On the other hand, if person P belongs to Q then Q has right to the use of P 
and what belongs to P without his consent. For example, a master has the 
right to the use of his serfs and their belongings without their consent. For 
heteronomous persons (serfs) we have the following theorems. For every het-
eronomous P there is a person Q who has right to the use of P without his 
consent. If P is a heteronomous person then there is another person Q who 
has right to the use of P’s means without his consent. Also, if a means be-
longs to a heteronomous P then there is a person Q without whose consent P 
has no right to the use of that means.  
Concerning autonomous collectives, we see that a member of an autono-
mous collective has right to the use of any other members’ means without 
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 Obviously, we can define slightly different notions of right in terms of our fundamen-
tal relation ‘x belongs to y’. However, it is not our aim to give a list of all possible con-
cepts that we can define.  
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their consent. Moreover, members of the same autonomous collective have 
right to the use of each other without consent. Of course, the autonomous col-
lective itself may be based on a contract. That was the case with Rousseau’s 
social contract, which first creates a ‘People’. However, once the People has 
been created as an autonomous collective, no further consent is required 
when one member, acting as a citizen, exercises his sovereign function in 
making law for all the other members. Only the constitution of the collective 
requires actual consent, particular legislation does not. 
In our discussion so far, we have used the expression ‘x is property of p’ as 
synonymous with ‘x belongs to p’. We easily can define other and stronger 
notions of property. For example, we can define ownership as follows: 
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Thus, a master owns what belongs to his serfs, if neither his serfs nor their 
belongings are the property of another, independent person. Clearly, self-
owners are autonomous persons. Indeed, substituting ‘P owns P’ for ‘P owns 
X’ in definition 12 and making appropriate substitutions in its definiens, we 
find that ‘P owns P’ turns out to be equivalent to ‘P is an autonomous per-
son’. Consequently, autonomous persons are self-owners. On the other hand, 
only self-owners can be sovereign, but not all self-owners need be sovereign. 
It also follows that an imaginary person cannot own what belongs to him, for 
what belongs to an imaginary person necessarily belongs to some other per-
son who does not belong to him. To put this differently, an owner must be a 
real person.  
Again, it is worth noting the essential implication of our definition for 
autonomous collectives. If a member of an autonomous collective owns X 
then every member of that collective owns X—which is another expression 
of the perfect community and communism of such collectives.  
Of course, we could define other types of property—for example, common 
property, communal property—but we shall not overburden this informal dis-
cussion with too many definitions. A far more interesting extension of the 
logical analysis results if we introduce the concept of action by means of an 
appropriate set of axioms. Then we can consider law as an order persons, 
their means and actions, and include in our analysis the right to do something 
as well as freedoms, liberties, obligations, inalienable rights, and harms that 
are relevant from the point of view of law. However, this is not the place to 
expound this extension.19 Here, we shall continue to look at law as an order 
of persons and their means. It should be clear that the relation ‘x belongs to 
y’ as delimited by the axioms 1 and 2 allows us to define quite a number of 
concepts that are familiar from the theoretical and philosophical literature on 
law.  
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 See “The Logic of Law” (referred to in note 14). 
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The general principle of justice 
One extension that we should consider is the concept of innocence. We have 
to consider the introduction of that concept as an extension because we do 
not define innocence in terms of the relation ‘x belongs to y’. Of course, 
theories of law may differ significantly in their stipulations regarding the ma-
terial conditions of innocence. Nevertheless, the distinction between persons 
who are innocent and persons who are not is of the first importance in any 
theory of law. In fact, it is difficult to see in what way a theory of law can be 
practically relevant if it does not differentiate between innocent persons and 
others. One reason is that we need the concept of innocence to distinguish 
between justice and injustice—and that distinction, after all, is a primary rea-
son for developing a theory of law. 
We use the concept of an innocent person to formulate a general principle 
of personal justice. 
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Thus, a non-innocent person cannot be considered in justice to be a free per-
son and to belong only to himself. He must have done something or some-
thing must have happened that gave some other person a lawful claim to his 
person. A non-innocent person always belongs to some other person. While 
this does not exclude him from being a member of an autonomous collective, 
it does rule out that he is a sovereign person. Notice that the principle does 
not say that all innocent persons are free. For example, we may have a theory 
of law that allows innocent persons to be slaves or serfs. Alternatively, we 
may have a theory that allows corporations or other artificial persons to be 
innocent and yet insists that artificial persons cannot be autonomous. Such 
theories are neither necessarily inconsistent in themselves nor formally in-
consistent with the concept of justice.  
From the general principle of justice, it follows that if no person is inno-
cent, then no person is sovereign. It also follows that if there is only one per-
son he must be innocent. The existence of a non-innocent person indicates 
the existence of at least two persons. Remembering what we deduced con-
cerning autonomous collectives, we also see that, in a world with a finite 
number of persons, if none of them is innocent then there must be at least one 
autonomous collective (with at least two members). In such a finite world 
without innocent persons, there are, therefore, some strictly autonomous per-
sons and perhaps also heteronomous persons, but no sovereign persons. For 
example, if one should interpret the doctrine of ‘original sin’ to mean that no 
human persons are innocent in the sense of law, then no human can be a free 
or sovereign person. In that case, autonomous collectives and master-serf re-
lations are the only conditions of humankind that are consistent with the gen-
eral principle of justice. 
  20 
Natural persons and natural law 
So far, we have discussed law without making the distinction between natural 
law and artificial law that we introduced in a previous part of this paper. It is 
time to return to that distinction and to extend our analytical apparatus by in-
troducing another primitive concept: ‘x naturally belongs to y’ or ‘x belongs 
to y by nature’. How we should interpret that expression is not our concern 
here. Our interest is solely in making the distinction between natural and arti-
ficial law, not in analysing or proposing any particular material or substantive 
theory of natural law. 
Natural law, as noted before, is the order of natural persons. We define the 
concept of a natural person as follows. 
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Thus, whereas a real person lawfully belongs to himself, a natural person 
naturally belongs to himself. Whereas the opposite of a real person is an 
imaginary person, the opposite of a natural person is an artificial person, one 
who does not naturally belong to himself.  
The relation ‘x naturally belongs to y’ is logically independent of ‘x law-
fully belongs to y’. Therefore, the axioms I.1 and I.2 do not apply to it. To 
constrain the permissible interpretations of ‘x naturally belongs to y’, we in-
troduce the following axioms. 
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It follows from the definition and axiom II.2 that a natural person naturally 
belongs to himself and only to himself. Noting the analogy between that con-
sequence and the definition of a [lawfully] free person, we can say that a 
natural person is naturally free. Of course, nothing follows from this concern-
ing the question whether a natural person is lawfully free or not.  
Clearly, for every natural person, some means naturally belongs to him. 
Also, for every pair of natural persons, there is a means that naturally belongs 
to one of the pair but not to the other. It is out of the question that one person 
by nature is a serf or subject of another.  
The definition and the axioms obviously make sense when applied to hu-
man persons. A human person naturally belongs to himself and himself 
alone. He has an immediate and indeed natural control of many parts, powers 
and faculties of his body, which he shares with no other person. To make my 
arm rise, I simply raise it. Other persons would have to grab my arm and 
force it to move upwards or they would have to make me raise it by making 
threats or promises. The same is true for other movements of the body and 
for thinking and speaking. A human body, as a means of action, belongs 
naturally to one person and one person only.  
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However, the concept of a natural person, as it is defined here, is purely 
formal. We are not defining what a human person is. Natural law theorists 
focus on natural persons (in an ordinary sense of the word ‘natural’) as the 
persons whose existence is necessary to make sense of law as an order of per-
sons. However, although we may believe that human persons are natural per-
sons, and perhaps the only natural persons, we cannot charge a purely formal 
theory with these assumptions. A legal positivist, for example, might apply 
the definition and the axioms to ‘states’ or to ‘legal systems’. Of course, he 
would not use ‘by nature’ or ‘naturally’ but an expression such as ‘legally 
necessary’ or perhaps ‘by the fundamental presupposition of legal science’. 
Disdaining talk about natural persons and their natural rights, he nevertheless 
assumes that the whole conceptual edifice of law rests on a collection of ba-
sic entities—states, legal systems—and their rights. In the terminology of this 
section, they are his ‘natural persons’. However, positivism clearly involves a 
misappropriation of the form of natural law. It is an attempt to base the theo-
retical edifice of law on a personification of certain theoretical constructs. In 
taking these as the primary data for defining the concept of law, it ignores the 
fact that those theoretical constructs merely are descriptions of patterns of 
human actions from which any reference to the actual human agents that pro-
duce those patterns has been eliminated.20  
The Postulates of natural law 
The concept of a natural person that we defined in the previous section is in-
dependent of the general concept of a ‘person in law’ that we introduced ear-
lier. We now have to establish some connection between the two, a logical 
link between, on the one hand, the concepts of a natural person and what 
naturally belongs to him and, on the other hand, the general theory of law as 
an order of persons and their means of action. To do that, we need to intro-
duce some postulates of natural law. They are intended to capture the distinc-
tive convictions that make up the idea of a natural order or law of persons, as 
far as we can express them in our formal system.  
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No matter what a material theory of law may say about other sorts of persons, 
it cannot be a theory of natural law unless it denies that there is at any time an 
actual infinity of natural persons. 
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With the help of Naturalism, we can deduce that every person belongs to at 
least one natural person. Note that the postulate of naturalism says ‘belongs 
[by law]’, not ‘belongs by nature’. According to Naturalism, the responsibil-
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 This is obvious in the norm-based and rule-based expositions of positivism in the 
writings of Hans Kelsen (The Pure Theory of Law) and H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of 
Law). 
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ity for any means or person—and therefore for any action—ultimately always 
rests with a natural person. It also follows that only natural persons are free 
or sovereign.  
In conjunction with the postulate of Finitism, Naturalism implies that not 
every natural person can be heteronomous. In other words, at least one natu-
ral person must be autonomous. Consequently, natural law as an order of 
natural persons must contain at least one sovereign natural person or else at 
least one autonomous collective of natural persons with at least two strictly 
autonomous members. 
Naturalism is the very heart of any natural law theory that takes the word 
‘natural’ seriously. It forces any natural law theory that assigns sovereignty to 
a non-human person — if human beings are the prime candidates for being 
identified as natural persons — to classify such a person as natural. That 
move may not be plausible when it leads to a conflation of what in other dis-
cussions would be considered distinct categories, say, the natural on the one 
hand and the supernatural, the artificial, the fictional, or the imaginary on the 
other hand. 
In addition to those postulates of Finitism and Naturalism, which determine 
the basic structure of natural law, we have two postulates that determine the 
relations between what naturally belongs to a person and what lawfully be-
longs to him. 
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A natural law theory holds that whenever it is established that something be-
longs naturally to a person, that fact is enough to say that the thing in ques-
tion is the lawful property of that person. From the postulate of consistency 
and axiom II.2, we deduce that only real persons are natural persons and that 
what belongs naturally to a person belongs lawfully to any person to whom 
he belongs. 
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There can be no claim to a person’s natural property that is separate from a 
claim to that person himself. In short, in natural law, the natural property of a 
person is inseparable from the person whose natural property it is. The two 
are indivisibly linked.  
From the postulates of individualism and consistency it follows that what 
belongs naturally to a person P belongs to another person Q if and only if P 
belongs to Q.  Obviously, Q has right to deny P the use of what naturally be-
longs to P only if P belongs to Q. Also, Q has right to deny a natural person P 
the use of himself only if P belongs to Q. 
The Principle of natural justice 
Earlier we stated a general principle of personal justice. Here we should add 
what I take to be the principle of personal justice in natural law.  
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In natural law, a person who is not free is either an artificial person or else he 
is not innocent. This is a way of saying that a justification must be given for 
denying freedom to a natural person—that is, for asserting that he lawfully 
belongs to some other person. That justification should consist in a proof of 
his guilt. Together with the general principle of justice, this gives us: A natu-
ral person is free (or sovereign) if and only if he is innocent.  
Natural personal justice and Consistency entail that an innocent natural per-
son is autonomous—in other words, that no innocent natural person is heter-
onomous. It also follows that no innocent natural person is strictly autono-
mous (i.e. a member of an autonomous collective). Thus, there is no innocent 
way in which a natural person can deprive himself of his freedom or sover-
eignty by making another person responsible for him, either as his master or 
as his ruler.  
Other consequences of the principles of natural justice are 1) that for every 
pair of innocent natural persons, some means belong(s) to only one of them; 
2) that for every innocent natural person, there is a means that belongs exclu-
sively to him; 3) that what belongs naturally to an innocent person belongs to 
him exclusively; 4) that an innocent person owns what naturally belongs to 
him.  
As we shall see, the combination of the concepts of innocence and justice 
sets the theory of natural law apart from the commoner types of political or 
legal (‘positivistic’) theories of law. The latter tend to pay little or no atten-
tion to the distinction between innocent and non-innocent people, and to fo-
cus on questions of efficacious and perhaps efficient government rather than 
questions of justice.  
Law and human beings 
The place of human beings in law 
We are now in a position to turn our attention to the status of human beings 
in natural law or the order of natural persons. Several postulates can be sug-
gested. 
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Obviously, anti-humanism has no use for the principle of natural justice in its 
consideration of human beings. It may acknowledge that only innocent hu-
mans can be free persons, but it does not hold that in justice an innocent hu-
man being is entitled to freedom. Anti-humanism is the postulate underlying 
modern positivism. As we have seen, positivism reserves natural personhood 
to legal systems or states and personhood to artificial persons such as social 
positions, roles and functions within a legal system. People have a place in 
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law only as holders of such positions or as performers of such roles and func-
tions. Thus, human beings have no rights of their own. Natural law theories, 
on the other hand, are committed firmly to the view that the natural persons 
par excellence are human beings.   
Weaker versions of anti-humanism imply that only some humans are not 
natural persons while others are. An anti-humanism of this sort could ride in 
on the back of the postulate of humanist naturalism.  
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This postulate asserts that only humans are natural persons. Consequently, it 
is unacceptable to those who believe the natural law comprises non-human 
yet natural persons (animals, gods, demons, personified historical or socio-
logical phenomena like tribes, nations, states, or whatever). On the other 
hand, the postulate leaves open the weak anti-humanist possibility that some 
human beings are not natural persons. Arguably, some human beings cannot 
be classified as natural persons because of genetic or other defects that cause 
them to lack the capacity to act as persons. However, humanists certainly 
would refuse to leave open the possibility that some human beings that have 
that capacity should not be regarded as natural persons.  
In conjunction with the postulate of naturalism and the general principle of 
justice, the postulate of humanist naturalism implies that all free persons are 
innocent human beings. 
Radically opposed to anti-humanism is the postulate of naturalist human-
ism: 
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Clearly, naturalist humanism in conjunction with the principle of natural jus-
tice implies that all innocent human beings are free persons. However, it 
maintains that there may be natural persons other than human beings.  
Of course, as noted before, one can make a good case for the thesis that 
very young children or humans with severe mental deficiencies should not be 
considered as persons because they do not have the requisite capacities to act 
as purposive agents. Moreover, they have no capacity for understanding what 
it is to have or to lack a right. However, if we read the postulate as a pre-
sumption—all human beings must be presumed to be natural persons when 
there is no proof to the contrary—then we can take much of the sting out of 
that objection. Another but rather vague way to do that, is to construe the 
words ‘human being’ as short for ‘normal human being’.  
The conjunction of the two humanist postulates mentioned above gives us a 
general postulate of humanism. 
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In conjunction with the postulates of natural law and the principles of general 
and natural justice, Humanism implies that all and only innocent human be-
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ings are free. 
Leaving aside merely fanciful and nominally possible interpretations of the 
concept of a natural person, we have to make do with the postulate of human-
ism. Assuming further that human beings enter the natural order as innocent 
persons, the postulate also implies that the ‘original status in natural law’ of 
every human person is that of a sovereign person.  
If we are very liberal in our ontology of the natural world, the postulate of 
naturalist humanism might enter as a possible candidate. However, it would 
bring in its wake controversies about what non-human natural persons there 
could be, which we could not decide by any rational method. In any case, 
natural justice obtains only if innocent human beings are left to be free or to 
belong to themselves and only to themselves. 
As noted above, the postulate of humanism implies that all and only inno-
cent human beings are free. In other words, it implies that ‘sovereignty’ is the 
status in natural law of an innocent human being. Thus, all the propositions 
that we have derived about the rights of sovereign persons apply without re-
striction to innocent human beings. An innocent human being has right to the 
use of what he owns—in particular, his own body—without the consent of 
any other human or non-human person. Moreover, no natural or artificial per-
son has right to the use of what belongs to an innocent human person without 
his consent.  
Those propositions state the natural rights of a human person, at least in so 
far as he is innocent. They are the logical basis of the theory of anarchocapi-
talism, which is, therefore, a theory of natural law and justice. Its distinctive 
characteristic, which sets it apart from other theories of law as an order of 
persons, is its application of the concepts of a natural person, an innocent 
person, and the principle of natural justice, to human beings.  
Law without justice 
The proof of the sovereignty of innocent human beings crucially involves the 
principles of justice and the concept of innocence. If we leave aside refer-
ences to the principles of justice then we no longer can prove the thesis of 
individual sovereignty for innocent human beings. However, that does not 
mean that we cannot derive any conclusion about the status in natural law of 
humans. Indeed, the postulate of consistency implies that natural persons 
(which, according to Humanism, are human beings) are persons in the sense 
of law. Thus, any theory of law that denies that human beings are persons 
violates that postulate of natural law. Moreover, the combined postulates of 
Finitism and Naturalism imply that at least some natural persons (human be-
ings) must be autonomous. Therefore, if we postulate Humanism, no theory 
of natural law can hold that all humans are heteronomous persons. At least 
some of them must be autonomous.  
Consequently, if we reintroduce the concept of innocence but leave out the 
principles of justice, we have a choice of natural law theories that deny that 
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freedom or sovereignty is the natural right of all innocent human beings. 
Among those theories, some are consistent with the notion of ‘equal rights’ 
for all innocent human beings. Their common characteristic is that they as-
sign to every innocent human being the status of a strictly autonomous person 
or membership in an autonomous collective.  
Other theories of natural law without justice are not compatible with the no-
tion of ‘equal rights’. For example, a theory of this sort may hold that while 
some innocent human beings are sovereign, others are strictly autonomous. 
Another possibility is that some innocent human persons are regarded as sov-
ereign, while the others are regarded as heteronomous. Obviously, other dis-
tributions of the attributes of sovereignty, strict autonomy and heteronomy 
among human beings are also possible.  
Philosophically speaking, an ‘equal status’ type of theory is considerably 
less demanding than an ‘unequal status’ type. Because it starts with the prem-
ise that, in respect of the law, human beings are fundamentally alike, it needs 
no justifying argument for discriminating among innocent human beings. An 
argument for assigning to such persons one status rather than another is all it 
needs to provide. Note, however, that a theory of a type that assigns to all or 
some innocent human persons the original status of a member of an autono-
mous collective need not assign all of them to the same collective. Similarly, 
theories that assign to all or some innocent human persons the status of a het-
eronomous person need not assign them all to the same masters or rulers. All 
of those theories require not only an argument for justifying their pick of the 
original status in law of any human being, but also an argument justifying a 
particular distribution of human persons among an untold number of autono-
mous collectives or rulers. 
Only theories that assert that every human person originally (in his state of 
innocence) is a sovereign person avoid those complications of discrimination 
and distribution. Formally speaking, there is only one such theory. As we 
have seen, it is the humanistic theory of natural law to the extent that it makes 
a person’s status in law depend on his innocence according to the principles 
of justice. It is the only type of theory that combines freedom and equality as 
defining the natural rights of innocent human beings. In short, it holds that, 
for human persons, ‘freedom among likes’ is the only lawful condition. 
If we accept the postulate of humanism and the principles of justice, then 
the concept of natural human law is formally unambiguous. However, it does 
not leave any room for an original right of legislation, only for contractual 
obligation. In that sense, it has decidedly anarchistic implications, as indeed 
we should expect from any theory that takes freedom and likeness (‘equal-
ity’) for human beings seriously. Not surprisingly, at all times, major political 
and social thinkers have attempted to deny that conception of natural human 
law. They endeavoured to replace it with a conception of a social law in 
which all or some human beings merely function as artificial persons, defined 
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by imposed rules. They did so by attacking either the thesis that innocent 
natural human persons are free or the thesis that they all are equal in law.  
For each of those strategies, we can distinguish between attempts to prove 
that for human beings the characteristic of freedom or equality is in fact false 
and attempts to prove that, although it is true, it nevertheless is undesirable. 
Plato’s theory of the ‘noble (or necessary) lie’ grants that all humans are 
‘equally children of the Earth’ but then argues that they must be convinced 
that their souls are made of different stuff (gold, silver, bronze) to make them 
accept the inequality imposed by the structure of the polis. Rousseau claimed 
that though ‘men are born free, everywhere they are in chains’, and pro-
ceeded to legitimate their loss of natural freedom (and its transmutation into 
the ‘civic liberty’ of a particular state). Aristotle flatly denied that likeness 
(‘equality’) was a natural relation. His theory of ‘slaves by nature’ was the 
egregious expression of that denial, which made social order ‘natural’ by cit-
ing nature as the formal cause of rule and servitude. Marx denied that free-
dom was even possible for a ‘particular individual’. It would be attainable 
only in the advanced stages of communism, and then only for the ‘universal 
individual’.  
The denial of equality, which implied that natural freedom could be at most 
the privilege (that is, the ‘liberty’) of a social or political elite, dominated in 
attacks on natural law until the eighteenth century. At that time, the attack 
began to aim at the concept of freedom, making ‘equality’ quasi-sacrosanct. 
However, that ‘equality’ no longer was the natural likeness of human beings 
(as members of the same species), but an equality of social position. To be-
come ‘socially equal’, human beings had to renounce their freedom.  
The denial of equality implied that at least some innocent individuals 
lacked the natural right of freedom or had the status of a heteronomous per-
son. It implied a distinction between rulers and masters, on the one hand, and 
others who, although they are innocent, are subjects and serfs. This made it 
possible to introduce the notion of lawful political rule or legislation ‘of one 
man over another’.  
The denial of freedom by theories that nevertheless assign an original status 
of strict autonomy to all or some human persons allows the introduction of 
the notion of lawful political rule or legislation of a ‘republican’ kind. Indeed, 
as we have seen, within an autonomous collective every member has right to 
the use of every other member as well as of all means that do not belong to 
any one outside the collective. In other words, every member has right to im-
pose his will or rule on the other members while being himself subject to the 
rule of every other member. In its crude form, such a collective is what 
Hobbes called ‘the natural condition of mankind’ and Marx ‘raw commu-
nism’.21 In its civic form, it is the republic of Rousseau, in which human be-
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 See the essay ”Private Property and Communism”, in K. Marx, Economic and Phi-
losophical Manuscripts (1844; Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1959, tr. M.Milligan) 
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ings have no status except as means of action, or serfs and subjects, of the 
artificial person that is the Citizen.  
The common element of those freedom- or equality-denying theories, there-
fore, is the idea of one or more natural persons ruling innocent others — and 
that idea, disguised as the power of legislation, is very much the centrepiece 
of most political or legal theories of law. Clearly, all attempts to justify legis-
lation (as distinct from contractual obligation) must reject the principle of 
natural justice, which is that innocent natural persons are free. 
As we noted before, among lawyers of a positivistic persuasion, the com-
mon denial of natural law and justice takes the form of a denial of the postu-
late that human beings are natural persons. In this, they make use of Rous-
seau’s strategy of substituting particular aspect-persons as the primary 
subjects of law. We have seen that Rousseau considered natural persons un-
der a certain aspect, as citizens, and assumed that they accordingly have 
rights only as citizens. Thus, in the legal order of the state, neither Jean nor 
Jacques has any rights; only citizen(Jean) and citizen(Jacques) have rights.  
Obviously, the aspects under which we can consider natural persons are in-
numerable. They do not form a closed set. Any aspect of a person P might be 
personified. A theory of law that took aspect-persons as its starting point 
would have an arbitrary basis in its selection of relevant aspect-persons a(P), 
b(P), c(P), and so on ad infinitum. It would allow us to say that P is one per-
son but also that, from the point of view of law, P-as-a-woman is a different 
person with a different set of rights. Similar constructions are possible, as the 
case may be, for P’s rights as a consumer, a member of some ‘minority’ or 
other, a worker, a child, a childless person, a pensioner, a veteran, an obese 
person, a Muslim, and so on. The multiplication of persons would apply to 
every natural person. It is then all too tempting to dismiss P himself alto-
gether and simply add P-as-a-human-being, say h(P), to the list of aspect-
persons.  
As soon as we admit aspect-persons as persons in their own right and not 
simply as heteronomous serfs of a natural person, we can assign a different 
status in law to each aspect. Consequently, a natural person P, considered un-
der one aspect, a(P), might be sovereign and at the same time, considered un-
der another aspect, b(P), heteronomous or a member of this or that autono-
mous collective — yet P himself need not have a status in law. Arguably, that 
is very nearly the ruling conception of persons and rights in fashionable opin-
ion today. However, it is indicative of a complete dissociation of the concepts 
of ‘person’ and ‘rights’ from any reality. With the suggestion that a natural 
person is simply a ‘theoretical construct’, the result of assembling apparently 
pre-existing different aspect-persons, it is also a denial of the proposition that 
a natural person is an individual person. It is in fact a complete dissolution of 
the idea of a natural law. 
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Anarchocapitalism rests on the notion of natural law as an order of natural 
persons rather than a binding set of rules or commands. As a normative the-
ory, it holds not only that we have good reasons to respect the natural order 
but also that we have no right not to respect it.22 However, whether or why 
natural law ought to be respected—that is to say, whether we ought to respect 
one another for the free persons we are—was not the issue here. My purpose 
was not to try to justify any particular position in ethics or politics. It was 
only to explicate and to de-mystify the concept of the natural law that anar-
chocapitalism presupposes. Any one who can grasp the notions of a human 
person and what belongs to him, and of innocence, and the distinction be-
tween artificial and natural persons, should be able to comprehend what natu-
ral law and natural rights are. Nevertheless, I hope that the analysis will help 
the reader to get a clearer view of some of the problems of justification in 
ethical or political discourses about law. At the very least, it should clarify 
the logic of the anarchocapitalist claim that individual human beings are sov-
ereign persons in natural law.  
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 I have provided an argument to prove that position elsewhere. See my Het Funda-
menteel rechtsbeginsel (Kluwer-Rechtswetenschappen, Antwerp, 1983), especially 
chapter 3. 
